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ARTICLE 
A REGULATORY SCHEME THAT WORKS: THE CASE FOR 
A STATUTORY RIGHT TO REPRESENTATION BY 
COUNSEL IN MARYLAND RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE 
TRANSACTIONS 
By: Robert P. Pratz1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The residential real estate crisis underlying the present economic 
weakness in the United States has many causes. However, one of the 
particularly troubling aspects has been the substantial number of 
homeowners in foreclosure claiming ignorance of the terms and 
conditions of their mortgage financing agreements. Such claims suggest 
the likely inherent weakness of disclosure-based regulatory mechanisms. 
Maryland has adopted a regulatory philosophy based on mandated 
disclosures throughout the process of obtaining mortgage financing 
secured by residential real property. This system is fatally flawed 
because the disclosures are required to be made by parties whose interests 
are inherently inimical to the interests of consumers, and no provision 
exists for assuring that consumers understand the information they are 
recelvmg. This fundamental problem makes reliance on mandated 
disclosure unworkable. 
A better approach is to embrace the virtues of adversarial 
representation and introduce a statutory right to representation by counsel 
as the primary consumer protection in Maryland's residential mortgage 
marketplace. Our common law tradition of adversarial representation in 
both criminal and civil proceedings is predicated upon the inherent 
reliability of the outcomes, derived from the tug and pull of zealously 
advocated interests. This tradition is expanded and amplified by the 
ethical and professional duties owed to a client by an attorney under the 
Rules of Professional Conduct. The introduction of a professional 
advocate will enhance systemic reliability, which, in tum, will reduce the 
likelihood of a future catastrophic disintegration in the residential real 
1 Mr. Pratz is an attorney practicing in Maryland. He is a 2011 graduate, cum laude, of 
the University of Baltimore School of Law. He also has a Master of Business Administration 
degree with a concentration in International BusinesslFinance from Loyola University in 
Maryland and a Bachelor of Science in Business Administration, cum laude, from Charleston 
Southern University. Immediately prior to entering law school, Mr. Pratz was the owner and 
president of a mortgage lender operating in Maryland. He is presently corporate vice-
president of a title insurance company and has been a licensed title closer. His professional 
experience also includes serving in senior executive positions in both the finance and 
marketing functions. 
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estate market and increase consumer confidence in the security of their 
financial arrangements. 
II. RECOMMENDATION 
This paper proposes a strengthening of Maryland's consumer 
protections in residential mortgage transactions by providing a statutory 
right to counsel paid for by the mortgage industry. Such a right would 
provide consumers the opportunity to have an independent appraisal of a 
lender's offer, and to have a non-conflicted advisor/advocate explain the 
duties, responsibilities, and likely costs of a particular proposal. The 
present protections - essentially a system of complex disclosure rules -
proved inadequate to protect the interests of mortgage consumers. 
III. A CAUTIONARY TALE 
Mr. and Mrs. Jones2 first entered the office oftheir soon-to-be attorney 
in the early months of 2009. Mr. Jones was a truck driver for a national 
food service distribution company. Mrs. Jones was an assistant teacher at 
a government agency-sponsored daycare facility. The family had a 
combined annual income of approximately $60,000.00, and lived in a five 
bedroom, three bath single-family home that they had purchased for 
approximately $500,000.00 in 2006. 
Unfortunately, the Joneses had been swept up in the worst excesses of 
the recent real estate asset bubble. For years, they had pursued a 
conservative lifestyle and approach to financial matters that had, 
ultimately and tragically, become the springboard from which they 
plunged to financial disaster. 
Prior to the 2006 purchase, the Joneses had lived in a three bedroom, 
two bath townhome in Anne Arundel County, Maryland, that they 
purchased in the late 1990's for approximately $150,000.00 with a thirty-
year Federal Housing Administration (FHA) insured mortgage. The 
couple had a monthly mortgage payment of approximately $1,400.00, 
which they paid without fail. As the years passed, and the real estate 
asset bubble formed, the value of the Jones' home soared to nearly 
$250,000.00. The Joneses also had excellent credit ratings due to their 
prudent approach to the family'S financial matters. 
Sadly, the Joneses also proved susceptible to the lure of advertising 
and the hype surrounding the incredibly rapid growth in real estate asset 
values that occurred during the mid-decade. Believing that they needed 
to own a larger home, the Joneses began to peruse the multitude of 
2 The Joneses are a real couple whose story is summarized here. Their names and 
certain financial data have been changed to protect their identities. Otherwise, this is an 
accurate account of their experience. 
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mortgage financing offers they were receiving from the servicer of their 
loan, Countrywide Home Loans. Simultaneously, the Joneses put their 
townhome on the market. The couple eventually found a new-
construction home that they decided was perfect for them; the five 
bedroom, three bath home every childless couple needs. However, even 
factoring in the substantial down payment the Joneses would have 
following the sale of their townhome, the couple was unable to qualify 
for a conventional mortgage of approximately $450,000.00, due to 
insufficient income and excessive debt-to-income ratio.3 
Still, there was another avenue open to the Joneses. A Countrywide 
loan consultant suggested the couple consider a pay-option arm.4 As the 
Joneses could not qualify under the fully amortizing or interest-only 
calculations, the minimum payment option seemed to be the answer to the 
couple's dilemma. In short order, the Joneses sold their townhome and 
moved into the new home and began making the pay-option minimum 
payments of approximately $1,200.00 (net of taxes and insurance). The 
Joneses felt that they had reached their dream. 
Not clearly understood by the couple, however, was the effect of 
making minimum payments on the principal balance of their mortgage 
loan. Each month their principal loan balance was increasing by 
approximately $1,000.00 in a process called negative amortization. Also, 
the loan had a monthly adjusting interest rate that began resetting almost 
immediately after closing, making the minimum payment fluctuate. 
Finally, the Joneses bought their home near the peak of the housing 
market bubble, and paid the minimum down payment necessary to 
qualify for the loan. This combination became the witches' brew that 
eventually forced the Joneses into foreclosure and bankruptcy. 
Pay-option arms have a negative amortization limit, which, when 
reached, triggers an event termed "recasting." The most common 
negative amortization limits are 110% and 125% of the original loan 
balance. When a pay-option arm recasts, the then outstanding principal 
balance and the fully indexed interest rate are used to calculate a fully 
amortizing payment over the remaining term of the loan. For the Joneses, 
the limit of 110% was reached in 2008. The recasting of the loan, then 
with a principal balance of nearly $500,000.00, caused the required fully 
3 Typically, mortgage underwriting is predicated on the five e's of credit; character, 
capital, collateral, conditions and capacity. Income sufficiency and debt-to-income ratio are 
measures of capacity. 
4 The pay-option arm is a particularly complex instrument with substantial risks to 
borrowers. The terms of a pay-option arm allowed a borrower to pay a fully amortizing 
payment, an interest-only payment or a "minimum payment." The minimum payment was 
typically derived by applying an artificially low interest rate to calculate an interest-only 
payment. Borrowers' capacity to qualify for the loan would be based on the minimum 
payment. 
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amortizing minimum payment to jump to approximately $3,450.00 (net 
of taxes and insurance). The Joneses were unable to pay this amount and, 
ultimately, ceased making mortgage payments altogether. 
The Joneses brought their loan-closing package with them to their first 
consultation with their attorney. During that consultation, the Joneses 
repeatedly expressed their lack of understanding concerning the terms of 
their mortgage loan. They emphatically stated that they would not have 
taken such a loan if they knew the outcome could tum so devastatingly 
negative. 
Yet, in reviewing the loan-closing package, it was clear that the 
Joneses had received and acknowledged all of the required loan 
disclosure statements. Their signatures were all in place, and 
Countrywide had adequately complied with all Federal and Maryland 
regulatory requirements. In short, the Joneses had, in fact, been told 
what the loan was, and what it could do. What those disclosures failed to 
do, however, was ensure that the Joneses understood, prior to 
consummating the transaction, how the characteristics of their mortgage 
loan could precipitate such dramatically negative consequences. Simply, 
regulation by disclosure proved inadequate to protect the Jones', and 
ultimately the public's, interests.5 
IV. WHERE WE ARE AND How WE GOT HERE 
In 2011, it was projected that over 1.2 million U.S. homes would be 
repossessed.6 This represents a 20% increase over the record-setting pace 
of 2010.7 While 2011 is expected to be the high-water mark of the 
foreclosure wave in America, foreclosure filings8 since 20069 have 
manifested an increase in excess of 81 % in filings, and an increase of 
more than 120% to nearly 2.9 million properties subject to such 
proceedings. 10 These increases starkly illustrate the broad, and 
5 The Jones' story ends much more happily than it began. Countrywide modified their 
mortgage to extend the term to forty years, reduced the principal balance to the original 
amount of approximately $450,000.00, and lowered the interest rate to a fixed 2%. The 
Joneses are still in their home. 
6 Janna Herron, Firm predicts 1.2 million foreclosures, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Jan. 13, 
2011), http://cherokeetribune.comlview/full_story/ll 004198/article-Firm-predicts-I-2-
3million-foreclosures. 
7 See id. 
8 For the purposes of this paper, "foreclosure filings" serves as a term representing 
default notices, auction sale notices and bank repossessions. 
9 Foreclosure Activity Increases 75 Percent in 2007, REALTYTRAc (February/March 
2008), available at http://realtytrac.comlnews/customer/2008.2/foreclosureTrends.asp. 
10 Elizabeth Kim, Record 2.9M properties got foreclosure filings in 2010, THE BUSINESS 
JOURNAL - MILWAUKEE (Jan. 13,2011), available at http://www.bizjournaIs.comlmilwaukee/ 
news/20 11/0 1I13/record-29m-properties-got -foreclosure.html. 
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implacable, reach of the foreclosure crisis presently confronting the 
United States. 
The root causes of this crisis are many and varied. Among them is the 
widespread slowdown in U.S. economic activity that began in 2006, 
including substantial housing price declines. II Prior to 2006, other 
factors were crucial contributors. U.S. Federal Reserve monetary policy 
decisions following the dot-com era stock market bubble and the terrorist 
attacks of September 11, 2001 put unprecedented amounts of liquidity 
into U.S. capital markets. 12 This enhanced capital liquidity encouraged 
financial institutions to develop high-risk business strategies supported by 
low-cost capital. 13 
Also contributing to the crisis was the global capital surplus resulting 
from ongoing U.S. trade imbalances, which placed substantial dollar-
denominated reserves in foreign hands. 14 The nations and investor groups 
holding these reserves sought to repatriate the funds by purchasing high 
yielding, dollar-denominated investments, many of which were asset-
backed securities (ABSs).15 U.S. mortgages, mortgage-backed securities 
(MBSs) and the more exotic variants of asset-based securities (i.e., 
collateralized debt obligations (CD Os) and credit default swaps (CDSs)) 
were exceptionally popular with foreign investors and hedge fund 
managers. 16 These instruments were aggressively marketed to investors 
as vehicles imbued with exceptional safety, due to the fallacious 
assumption that the U.S. real estate market would not be subject to 
extended, widespread price declines, and that the innovative financial 
instruments themselves offered unprecedented amelioration and 
management of risk. 17 
Further, the relentless pursuit of subprime mortgages by Fannie Mae 
and Freddie Mac (the Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSES))IS in 
11 U.S. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEV., REpORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ROOT CAUSES 
OF THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS, 19 - 21 (2010) [hereinafter REpORT TO CONGRESS], available at 
www.huduser.orglportallpublicationsIForeclosure_09.pdj 
12 John B. Taylor, Housing and Monetary Policy, Remarks Presented at the Policy Panel 
at the Symposium for Housing, Housing Finance and Monetary Policy, sponsored by the 
FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY, in Jackson Hole, WY (Sept. 2007); see also Eric S. 
Belsky & Nela Richardson, Understanding the Boom and Bust in Non-Prime Mortgage 
Lending 34 (Sept. 2010) (unpublished manuscript on file with the Joint Center for Housing 
Studies of Harvard University) [hereinafter Understanding the Boom]. 
13 Understanding the Boom, supra note 12, at 39. 
14 REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note II, at 37. 
15 Id. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. 
18 Heath Aston, Who are Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac?, THE SUNDAY TIMES (July 18, 
2008), available at http://business.timesonline.co.ukltol/business/industry _ sectorslbanking_ 
and_finance/article4345872.ece; CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES, CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
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response to Congressional and Executive branch housing initiatives l9, and 
the simultaneous expansion by major U.S. and global investment houses 
of public and private label mortgage securitization, led to explosive 
growth in the origination of risky loans.2o This growth, fueled by an 
increasingly fee-based lender compensation system (the so-called 
"originate to distribute system,,)21, substantially increased the aggregate 
risk subsumed in the market.22 These factors led to an extraordinary 
boom in the housing industry, to the point where housing prices began to 
inflate to bubble-like proportions. This boom attracted a host of 
unsophisticated consumers, many of whom were first-time buyers. 
Additionally, there was a significant increase in the complexity of 
mortgage products whose affordability was not easily explained by 
lenders. This complexity was difficult for consumers to comprehend, 
much less adequately understand.23 
V. How MARYLAND WAS AFFECTED BY THE CRISIS 
Maryland's experience during the foreclosure crisis is comparable to 
that reflected by national averages, as the state saw a significant increase 
in foreclosure starts (defined as the percentage of existing mortgages 
subject to an actual foreclosure process filing) from .22% to .83% 
between 2005 and 2008.24 While Maryland's 2005 foreclosure start rate 
was somewhat lower than the national average, .39%, the state's 2008 
foreclosure start rate was essentially identical to the national average. 25 
Further, the growth in foreclosure starts has continued through 2010, 
peaking at over 1.4%, and is predicted to remain at elevated levels for the 
foreseeable future. 26 Finally, the composition of Maryland's aggregate 
OFFICE: FANNIE MAE, FREDDIE MAC AND THE FEDERAL ROLE IN THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE 
MARKET 1 - 9 (Dec. 2010). 
19 Understanding the Boom, supra note 12, at 109 (discussing the Congressional and 
Department of Housing and Urban Development mandates placed on the GSEs to foster 
mortgage lending in minority communities and the GSEs response to those mandates to 
encourage low down payment and relaxed underwriting origination in previously under-
served communities). The discussion also includes an extensive analysis of the inherent 
tension created by permitting shareholder owned companies, acting with a United States 
government guarantee, to create exotic and risky securitizations, ultimately obligating the 
American taxpayer to trillions of dollars of mortgages. Id. 
20 REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 11, at 35. 
21 Understanding the Boom, supra note 12, at 24. The "originate to distribute" model 
began in the 1980s and gathered strength as the markets for MBS grew in the 1990s and the 
first part of the 2000s. Eventually, this model would replace the "originate and hold" model as 
the dominant system of mortgage origination. 
22 REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 11, at 38. 
23 ld. at 32. 
24 Id. at A-I. 
25 Id. at A-I through A-2. 
26 Tim Dunne and Kyle Fee, Economic Trends: Changes in Foreclosure and 
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mortgage loan pool has the nation's fifth highest concentration of high-
cost loans - exactly the type of loans most likely to end in foreclosure. 27 
By September of 2009, Maryland's subprime owner-occupied 
mortgage loans ninety-day default rate was 23.4%?8 The state's 
subprime foreclosure rate was 11.4%.29 The comparable prime mortgage 
rates were 3.6% and 1.9%, respectively.30 These numbers are especially 
alarming considering the relative economic stability Maryland 
experienced during national economic downturn. Unemployment rates in 
Maryland remained low, compared with national averages, 7.2% versus 
9.0% in January 2011. 31 The state's proximity to the national capital, its 
highly educated workforce, and substantial population of Federal workers 
and contractors has, in large measure, insulated the state from the 
extremes of the recession. Further buffering Maryland's economy is the 
location of several key Federal government installations within the state. 
Maryland is home to the National Security Agency, the Social Security 
Administration, Patuxent Naval Air Station, the National Institutes of 
Health, and Edwards Air Force Base, among others. These installations 
are economic engines providing economic-cycle resistant income 
generation to a large segment of Maryland's workforce. Federal 
employment provides over 200,000 jobs in Maryland, and accounts for 
approximately 7.4% of the state's overall employment.32 Four of the 
nation's wealthiest counties are Maryland counties (Howard, 
Montgomery, Charles and Calvert)33, and the state as a whole is the 
nation's 4th wealthiest.34 And yet, despite these advantages, Maryland 
has the nation's 10th highest foreclosure rate.35 
Unemployment Across States, FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF CLEVELAND (July 6, 2010), 
http://www.c1evelandfed.org/researchitrends/20 1 01071 010 1 regact.cfm. 
27 REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note II, at 29, A-I through A-2. 
28 Oep't of Legis. Servs., Fiscal Note, H.B. 1118,2010 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2010), 
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/20IOrsibillfilelhbII18.htm. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. OEP'T OF LABOR, News Release, Regional and 
State Employment and Unemployment Survey, 5, Mar. 10, 2011, available at www.bls.govl 
news. releaselarchivesllaus_0310201 I.pdf 
32 Robert 1. Rehrmann & Theresa M. Tuszynski, Impact of the Federal Government on 
Maryland's Economy, OEP'T OF LEG. SERVS, OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, 7-8 (Jan. 2011), 
available at mlis.state.md.usI20 I OrslmiscllmpactFederalGov.pdJ 
33 Francesca Levy, America's 25 Richest Counties, FORBES (Mar. 4, 2010), available at 
http://www.forbes.coml20-1 0103/04/america-richest -counties-Iifestyle-real-estate-wealthy-
suburbs.htm!. 
34 Les Christie, America's wealthiest (and poorest) states, CNNMoNEY (Sept. 16, 2010), 
available at http://money.cnn.coml2010/09/16/news/economy/Americas _ wealthiest_ statesl 
index.htm. 
35 Alan Zibel, Foreclosure rate steadies in May; see state-by-state chart, USA TODAY 
(June 11,2010), available at http://www.usatoday.comlmoney/economylhousing/2010-06-10-
foreclosures-may _ N .htm. 
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VI. MARYLAND'S REGULATORY SCHEME 
Maryland follows a regulatory scheme for mortgage lenders based on 
an initial licensing review, periodic file audit, and complaint response. 36 
The primary regulatory authority for mortgage lending is the 
Commissioner of Financial Regulation in the Department of Labor, 
Licensing and Regulation.37 Mortgage lenders must comply with both 
Maryland and Federal statutory requirements. The Federal requirements 
for mortgage lenders are governed by the Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
(ECOA)38, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA)39, the 
Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA)4o, the Fair Credit 
Reporting Act (FCRAt1, and the Truth in Lending Act (TILA).42 These 
laws generally require disclosure of relevant information concerning the 
terms and conditions of consumer financial transactions, and mandate a 
forms-based disclosure process intended to alert consumers to the import 
of those terms and conditions.43 The Commissioner of Financial 
Regulation's enforcement authority arises from Maryland's 
responsibilities under these Federal laws, combined with the Maryland 
Mortgage Lending Law44, and other relevant sections of Maryland's 
Code. 45 , 
Applicants for mortgage lender licensing are subject to an application 
review and licensing fee, a surety-bonding requirement, a minimum asset 
requirement, a pre-licensing education requirement, and a minimum 
experience requirement.46 The Department of Financial Regulation relies 
primarily on an enforcement system predicated on lender file audits and 
complaint response. Audits are scheduled by the Commissioner, and 
every licensee must be examined at least once every 36 months, except 
newly licensed mortgage lenders, whose audit must be completed within 
the first 18 months of licensing.47 The Commissioner may require any 
licensee to submit to an examination at any time, and is required to 
36 MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST., § 11-501 et seq. (West 2011) (outlining Maryland's 
Mortgage Lender Law). 
37 Id. 
38 15 U.S.c. § 1691 et seq. (2006). 
39 12 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. (2006). 
40 15 U.S.C. § 1639 et seq. (2006). 
41 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq. (2006). 
42 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (2006). 
43 REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note II, at 32. 
44 MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST., § 11-501 et seq. (West 2011). 
45 Maryland has a variety of statutory provisions respecting mortgage lending scattered 
throughout the Financial Institutions, Commercial Law Article, and the Real Property 
Articles. Suffice it to say that the provisions are adequately self-referential to carry out 
Maryland's regulatory scheme. 
46 MD. CODE REGS., 09.03.06.03, 23 (2011). 
47 MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST., § ll-515(a)(2)(ii)(West 2011). 
2012] The Case For a Statutory Right to Representation 195 
investigate any written complaint received.48 The file audits are primarily 
ex post facto reviews of lender compliance with the statutory disclosure 
requirements.49 The Commissioner can penalize a mortgage lender, or 
employee or agent of a mortgage lender, with anything from a cease and 
desist order, to administrative fines, to suspension or revocation of 
license, to felony penalties of up to 15 years imprisonment, and 
$100,000.00 fines for fraudulent conversion in excess of$300.00.50 
VII. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF MARYLAND'S REGULATORY 
SCHEME DURING THE CRISIS AND THE STATE'S RESPONSE 
As indicated above, Maryland fortunately enjoyed a lower than 
average foreclosure start rate prior to the mortgage market meltdown of 
2007.51 It is not entirely clear whether the efficacy of the state's 
mortgage lending regulatory system contributed to this favorable rate. 
Maryland's regulatory scheme is very similar in nature and operation to 
that of most states. In fact, the essential characteristics of the nation's 
mortgage market regulatory infrastructure are driven by compliance 
requirements in Federal legislation, such as the TILA, and the RESPA.52 
The disclosure regime underlying these Federal laws is founded on the 
theory that the provision of sufficient information concerning the terms 
and conditions of a particular transaction will ensure appropriate and 
informed borrower decision-making. 53 Sadly, when tested in the crucible 
of reality, this regime utterly failed to prevent the current crisis, and the 
assumption that the provision of information equals understanding was 
exposed as illusory. The regime's fundamental nature leads to a 
mechanistic compliance that does little to achieve its purported objective 
of enabling informed consumer decision-making. In fact, commentators 
had begun to recognize that its efficacy was increasingly suspect long 
before the meltdown in the mortgage market began. 54 As financial 
products grew progressively more sophisticated, the disclosure-based 
regulatory regime became increasingly irrelevant as the choices facing 
consumers grew more complex, and the possible outcomes of any 
decision virtually impossible to assess as to risk and cost. 55 While it may 
be true that Maryland's regulatory mechanism was adequately funded, 
properly staffed, and professionally managed, ultimately, the state's 
48 Id. at (b )(1 )-(2). 
49 Id. at (d)(I)-(3). 
50 MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST., §§ 11-516,11-517,11-523 (West 2011). 
51 REpORT TO CONGRESS. supra note 11, at A-I through A-2. 
52 Id. at 32. 
53 Id. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. 
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mortgage regulatory system proved inadequate to the challenge. In fact, 
the challenge the system faced was not one that had even been 
contemplated. 56 
As the mortgage market dissolved through 2007, some manner of 
legislative and regulatory response was necessary given the severity and 
scope of the meltdown's reach. Maryland reacted in several different 
ways. Maryland's General Assembly, during the 2008 Session, passed 
the Maryland Mortgage Fraud Protection Act. 57 The Act was passed in 
response to 30 mortgage fraud complaints received by the Commissioner 
of Financial Regulation in 2007, and an additional 67 investigations 
initiated by the Commissioner that year. 58 The Act created the crime of 
mortgage fraud in Maryland and authorized criminal penalties. Also in 
2008, the state strengthened the licensing requirements for mortgage 
lenders by increasing the surety bonding requirements, the net worth 
requirements, enhancing the Commissioner's enforcement powers, and 
imposing an "ability to repay" consideration requirement in mortgage 
underwriting. 59 In 2009, Maryland amended its mortgage lending and 
originator licensing legislation60 by incorporating the provisions of the 
Federal Secure and Fair Enforcement for Mortgage Licensing Act of 
2008.61 This legislation was intended to strengthen mortgage originator 
licensing requirements and adopt the Nationwide Multistate Licensing 
System and Registry (NMLSR) for Maryland mortgage originators. 62 
The state also outlawed foreclosure rescue transactions in 200863 , and 
modified foreclosure notice requirements in 2008, 2009 and 2010.64 
Finally, in 2010, the state instituted a last chance loss mitigation 
mediation requirement in foreclosure proceedings.65 
56 ld. 
57 MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP., § 7-401 et seq. (West 2011). 
58 Dep't of Legis. Servs., Fiscal Note, H.B. 360, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2008), 
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2008rslbillfilelhb0360.htm. 
59 Dep't of Legis. Servs., Fiscal Note, S.B. 270, 2008 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2008), 
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2008rslbillfile/sb0270.htm. 
60 MD. CODE ANN., FIN. INST., §§ 11-501 et seq., § 11-601 et seq. (West 2011). 
61 Dep't of Legis. Servs., Fiscal Note, H.B. 292, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2009), 
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2009rslbillfilelhb0292.htm. 
62 ld. 
63 MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP., § 7- 301 et seq. (West 2011) (Protection of Homeowners 
in Foreclosure Act). 
64 MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP., § 7- 105 et seq. (West 2011). 
65 Md. R. 14-209.1. 
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VIII. REPRESENTATION BY COUNSEL AS A REGULATORY 
AL TERNA TIVE 
What is patently obvious with respect to Maryland's response to the 
mortgage crisis is that every legislative and regulatory initiative was 
reflexive and backward looking. While all of the actions described above 
may be salutary in the abstract, none of them corrects - or even addresses 
- the inherent problem, namely, that the purported advocates of the 
consumer's interests enter the transaction with substantial financial 
interests conflicting with those of their "clients." In the absence of a 
mechanism to independently and actively champion the borrower's 
interests throughout the process, the regulatory system will remain 
inadequate to the essential task of protecting individual consumers and 
reducing the risk that society will have to foot the bill for poor consumer 
decisions and unscrupulous lender business practices. 
The mortgage financing agreement itself is essentially a hybrid 
contract where the parties dicker over some part of the transaction during 
the application process; typically, factors such as interest rate, pre-paid 
finance charges and term of years. However, this negotiation is not 
nearly as even-handed or binding as it may seem. Risk-based pricing, 
evaluation of a borrower's income and asset information, and collateral 
determination will all affect the final offer the lender makes as to rate, 
fees, and maturity. While the borrower is certainly not bound to accept 
the offer, the substantial investment of time and effort to reach the final 
offer stage virtually precludes the pursuit of alternatives. 66 
Moreover, the parties' respective substantive legal rights and remedies 
are embodied in the language of a contract of adhesion drafted by the 
lender's lawyers, and are not subject to negotiation. 67 The borrower will 
not normally see these documents prior to reaching the settlement table. 
These agreements typically involve multiple components68, are too 
lengthy to easily read at signing, and are written in the kind of dense 
legalese that frustrates understanding by lay consumers. The inherent 
disadvantages consumers suffer from this arrangement are compounded 
by the fact that the consumer usually is seeing these materials for the first 
time, and the setting is frequently a time-pressured circumstance with 
mUltiple parties at interest eagerly awaiting the consummation of the 
66 REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 11, at 32. 
67 Shelley Smith, Reforming the Law of Adhesion Contracts: A Judicial Response to the 
Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 1035, 1041 (2010). 
68 A typical mortgage financing transaction in Maryland may well require a note, a deed 
of trust or mortgage, addendurns and riders to the note and, in many cases, assignments of 
right from the borrower to the lender. 
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dea1.69 It is at this moment when consumers are at their greatest 
disadvantage and, therefore, most vulnerable. 
As the process is presently organized, there is simply no one at the 
table looking out for the interests of the persons ultimately bringing the 
money to the deal. Although no regulatory system can reasonably be 
expected to eliminate all transactional risk, thinking differently about the 
means employed to protect consumers' interests during mortgage 
financing transactions may provide Maryland a regulatory mechanism 
that portends superior short-term regulatory advantages, and 
advantageous long-term societal outcomes without increasing the 
aggregate cost of the transaction to the consumer. Rather than attempting 
to refine a system that is essentially incompatible with its alleged aims, 
and which has proven itself incapable of prospectively ensuring consumer 
well-being, I propose that Maryland adopt a regulatory scheme predicated 
on active representation by counsel of consumers' interests in 
transactions with mortgage lenders.70 
IX. AMERICA'S TRADITION OF ADVERSARIAL REPRESENTATION AND 
THE ATTORNEY IN THE ROLE OF COUNSELOR-ADVISOR 
America has embraced adversarial representation since its founding71 
as the elemental method in the search for truth in contested matters. Not 
only has the adversarial system been instrumental in the development of 
American criminal jurisprudence, it has been the lynchpin in the 
mitigation of grievances of the disenfranchised in civil litigation as well.72 
While some modern commentators have expressed pointed criticism of 
the adversarial system ofjustice73, such sentiment is not new. In fact, the 
adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 was intended to 
69 Other than the buyerlborrower, a typical sales transaction can have a seller, mUltiple 
real-estate agents, one or more lenders and the settlement/title insurance company involved in 
the transaction. Compensation for all of these parties will only be realized if the transaction is 
executed. 
70 While I argue for representation by licensed counsel as the basis of this proposal, there 
may well be other professionals with the knowledge and skills necessary to protect consumer 
interests in mortgage transactions. Certified Public Accountants, financial advisors or 
planners, or even some real estate professionals may be qualified to act as a borrower's 
representative. The Maryland General Assembly may well determine that expanding the pool 
of available representatives would be in the best interests of consumers. 
71 Monroe S. Freedman, Our Constitutionalized Adversary System, I CHAP. L. REv. 57 
(1998). 
72 ld. at 64. 
73 See, e.g., Amanda Frost, The Limits of Advocacy, 59 DUKE L. J. 447 (2009); see also 
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, The Trouble with the Adversary System in a Post-Modern, 
Multicultural World, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 5 (1996); Rosemary Nidiry, Restraining 
Adversarial Excess in Closing Argument, 96 COLUM. L. REv. 1299 (1996). These articles are 
but a sampling of the work devoted to this topic. 
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inject equity into the nation's civil litigation system.74 The Rules were 
proposed and adopted in response to disquiet associated with the 
commonly perceived "all or nothing" character of adversarial advocacy. 75 
Still, uncertainty remained in the courts as to the magnitude of the sea-
change, the shift toward open-handed discovery (arguably the most 
equitable and non-adversarial provision of the Rules) portended.76 
The Supreme Court resolved any doubt as to the role adversarial 
values would play in American civil litigation when it asserted 
protections approaching privilege of lawyer work -product, fact gathering, 
and analysis in its decision in Hickman v. Taylor.77 There, the Court 
stated that an attorney's primary duties are "to promote justice and to 
protect their clients' interests.,,78 The Court admonished the bench and 
stated that forcing the turnover of attorney work-product would seriously 
undermine the adversarial system, specifically stating "[t]he effect on the 
legal profession would be demoralizing. And the interests of clients and 
the cause of justice would be poorly served.,,79 Today, the adversarial 
system remains the nation's primary method for resolving disputes. 80 
While adversarial representation is customarily identified with judicial 
proceedings, mortgage-financing transactions are not such proceedings. 
They can be more appropriately described as semi-active negotiations 
where the parties dicker over only a few of the terms of the deal. Despite 
this difference, the virtues of adversarial representation can be readily 
applied to this realm in the interests of consumers. Freedman describes 
this application of the adversarial system outside of the courtroom thusly, 
"[a]ny lawyer who counsels a client, negotiates on a client's behalf, or 
drafts a legal document for a client must do so with an actual or potential 
adversary in mind. When a contract is negotiated, there is a party on the 
other side.,,81 This sentiment captures the essential duty of counsel, and 
is perpetuated in Maryland's Rules of Professional Conduct, which state 
74 Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE LJ. 1,3-4 (20lO). 
75 Id. at 4-5. 
76 Adoption of the Rules suggested a weakening of the nation's commitment to the 
adversarial system. 
77 Norman w. Spaulding, The Rule of Law in Action: A Defense of Adversary System 
Values, 93 CORNELL L. REv. 1377, 1401 (2008) (explaining the impact of the Supreme Court's 
decision in Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495,511-14 (1947». 
78 Hickman, 329 U.S. at 511. 
79 Id. Justice Jackson's concurring opinion is even more forthright in its emphasis on the 
cost that emasculating the adversarial system would entail. Id. at 515-16 (Jackson, J., 
concurring) 
80 David Barnhizer, The Virtue of Ordered Conflict: A Defense of the Adversary System, 
79 NEB. L. REv. 657,680 (2000). 
81 Monroe H. Freedman, Professionalism in the American Adversary System, 41 EMORY 
L.J. 467, 469 (1992). 
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"[a]s advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under the 
rules of the adversary system. As negotiator, a lawyer seeks a result 
advantageous to the client but consistent with requirements of honest 
dealing with others.,,82 
Despite its virtues, the nature of the adversarial system is at odds to 
some degree with the character of the residential mortgage transaction. 
The consumer is not likely to seek conflict with the lender. Rather, the 
consumer is motivated to find a way to consummate a deal. It is this very 
motivation that often induces consumers to take offers they do not 
adequately understand, and that may well have been designed to take 
advantage of the consumer's desire to complete the transaction. It is here 
that the attorney, in her role of counselor-advisor, is in the forefront. 
Maryland's Rules of Professional Conduct describe the advisor's role 
thusly, "[i]n representing a client, a lawyer shall exercise independent 
professional judgment and render candid advice. In rendering advice, a 
lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as 
moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant to the 
client's situation.,,83 The wording of this duty, particularly the second 
sentence, establishes that an attorney's purview as advisor is larger than 
that of a mere legal consultant. Rather, the expansive nature of the 
language suggests the advisory responsibility borne by an attorney is one 
that requires the contemplation of the totality of a client's circumstances 
when rendering advice. This is exactly the viewpoint necessary to ensure 
the protection of a client's interest in a complex transaction of significant 
value. 
X. HARNESSING THE VIRTUES OF REPRESENTATION TO 
REGULATORY REFORM 
As presently constituted, the mortgage financing system provides no 
effective mechanism for ensuring that consumers have adequate 
understanding, rather than merely disclosure, of the terms, conditions and 
obligations of a particular transaction.84 In fact, even where consumer 
education and counseling programs have been provided, borrower 
decision making was not appreciably superior, especially in the face of 
aggressive marketing campaigns by mortgage lenders. 85 Statutes 
requiring more disclosure, or which further outlaw anti-predatory lending 
practices, or which prohibit such lender compensation devices as yield-
82 Md. R. 16-812. 
83 Md. R. 16-812(2.1). 
84 REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 11, at 52. 
85 ld. 
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spread premium, or service-release premium86, will not suffice to fill the 
void in consumer knowledge and understanding. The missing element is 
a knowledgeable and trusted advisor/advocate whose loyalties lie solely 
with the consumer. 
As I anticipate the application of adversarial representation in the 
mortgage-financing arena, there would be no independent third-party 
arbiter, nor would the system alter the current method of utilizing 
standardized contracts in most transactions. Further, I am not suggesting 
that this system provide a forum for dispute over every point. The 
realities of modem commerce are considerations that cannot be 
disregarded in designing regulatory mechanisms. The system needs to 
support the consummation of these transactions, not thwart them. The 
imposition of structures or processes that unreasonably constrict 
transaction flow would fatally wound the nation's mortgage financing 
system. Instead, what I envision is a regulatory system that harnesses the 
energy of representation, the client-centric objectivity of the attorney as 
counselor-advisor, and that invokes the duties of loyalty and 
confidentiality in the meaningful protection of the interests of consumers 
during loan negotiation. 
Legislation mandating that residential mortgage borrowers be 
presented the opportunity, without cost, to consult with counsel can 
provide the means to ensure that consumers have adequate opportunity 
and resources to understand the import of a proposed transaction. By 
affirmatively embracing the virtues of a representative system as a 
regulatory tool, Maryland can provide consumers with an effective and 
easy-to-understand mechanism that both the legal system and the 
mortgage distribution system can readily integrate. This proposed system 
will fill the empty seat at the table that plagues the current system; the 
empty seat that concedes the potential for a future meltdown. 87 
The attorney as counselor-advisor will provide consumers with an 
objective and loyal voice to describe the benefits, costs, and implications 
of a proposed transaction. Moreover, the counselor-advisor will be in a 
position to discern the consumer's immediate needs, and long-term 
interests, and carefully weigh those against the offer presented. This is a 
critical component as residential mortgage transactions are complex and 
high value, and other parties to the transaction - often with their own 
86 Yield-spread premium is commission payable to mortgage brokers for originating a 
loan. Service-release premium is commission payable to mortgage lenders for originating a 
loan. The difference in the two forms of compensation is that lenders lend their own money, 
and are subsequently paid for transferring the loan to another lender, while broker loan 
transactions are conducted with funds from the initial lender. Both forms of compensation are 
interest and fee sensitive. 
87 REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 11, at 32. 
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counselor-advisors in tow - may well seek to shift risk away from 
themselves and onto the consumer In ways not obvious nor easily 
understood by lay people. 
Further, by placing a knowledgeable advocate at the consumer's 
elbow, lenders will find their loan offers and the terms and conditions of 
closing documents scrutinized by an officer of the court. The very fact 
that such scrutiny will be required in each loan transaction will make the 
overall mortgage marketplace more fair, efficient, and lower-cost by 
eliminating the distortions that occur when consumers unknowingly 
accept high-cost, high-risk loans to their detriment. Further, such 
advocacy on the consumer's behalf is also likely to create competition 
among lenders to provide the most favorable terms, transparency, and 
processing service; all of these developments will redound to the 
consumer's benefit. 
Finally, the proposed system will likely provide significant impetus 
for the adoption of more easily understood and fairer transaction 
documents. Critics of this proposal, most likely concerned about the 
impact on lenders, may suggest mandatory consumer representation will 
result in intractable negotiation between consumer and lender. Such 
concerns are ill-founded. The form contract has arisen as an 
indispensable means for businesses to conduct commercial-scale 
transactions88 , and its role in this proposed system of regulation need not 
be any different than it is today. There is no need to undertake extensive 
negotiation of each and every term of a consumer transaction. Rather, 
informed consumers, aided by an impartial and loyal counselor, can 
choose between offers (including the terms and conditions of the note and 
deed of trust, as well as the rate and fees) that have been reviewed and 
explained as to cost, conditions, and contingencies. 
XI. CONSIDERATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE SYSTEM 
It is especially noteworthy that the adoption of this proposed system 
should not cause an increase in Maryland state administrative 
expenditures. While the Commissioner of Financial Regulation will still 
perform the same pre-licensing reviews, periodic lender examinations and 
complaint response duties as presently required, the proposed system will 
add no new responsibilities to the Commissioner's staff. In fact, the 
actual number of mortgage lenders and originators89 subject to the 
88 Shelley Smith, Reforming the Law of Adhesion Contracts: A Judicial Response to the 
Sub-Prime Mortgage Crisis, 14 LEWIS & CLARKL. REv. 1035, 1084 (2010). 
89 Dep't of Legis. Servs., Fiscal Note, H.B. 944, 2011 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2011), 
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/20Ilrsibillfilelhb0944.htm.In 2010, the Commissioner 
had authority over 1,478 mortgage lenders and 5,007 mortgage originators in Maryland, down 
from more than 3,700 lenders and 11,000 originators in 2008. 
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Commissioner's oversight should continue to decline over time as the 
proposed system begins to force, through improved transactional scrutiny 
and market pressures, marginal, inflexible and dishonest lenders and 
originators from the market. Also, lender disclosure and regulatory 
compliance should improve as lenders seek to streamline the lending 
process by better ensuring file compliance in the knowledge that an 
experienced set of eyes will be critically reviewing the file, on behalf of 
the consumer, for discrepancies, errors, and deceptive practices. As 
these benefits materialize, the state may well be able to reduce the staff 
and budget of the Commissioner's office and re-direct those resources 
elsewhere. 
The necessary legal resources for the proposed regulatory system also 
seem to be largely in place. In 2008, Maryland was home to more than 
32,000Iawyers.9o As of the 2010 United States Census, Maryland had a 
population of approximately 5.7 million, up slightly from nearly 5.3 
million in 2000.91 Maryland also has just fewer than 2.4 million housing 
units (not all of which are owner-occupied units)92 and 54,605 of those 
units were sold in 2010.93 Although it is difficult to calculate precisely 
the number of instances of mortgage refinancing transactions in the state 
in 2010, the Mortgage Bankers Association has estimated that the total 
percentage typically hovers near 70% of the total market. 94 A simple 
extrapolation provides a reasonably accurate estimate of the extent of 
residential refinance activity in Maryland throughout 2010.95 
Approximately 127,500 consumers applied for mortgage refinancing 
during the year.96 Combined, these numbers suggest that the state's total 
mortgage activity was in the range of 182,000 transactions. Even 
assuming that merely 5% (1,600) of Maryland's lawyers would be 
interested in acting as borrower's counsel, these numbers suggest that 
each would have only two to three transactions per week. As it is 
reasonable to anticipate that a much higher participation rate is likely, 
90 Erin Delmore & Marisa M. Kashino, How Many Lawyers Are There?, 
WASHINGTONIAN, (Dec. 1,2009), available at http://www.washingtonian.com/articles/people/ 
14534.html. 
91 Census 2010 Redistricting (Public Law 94-171) Data For Maryland, MD. STATE DATA 
CENTER, http://planning.maryland.gov/msdc/census/Cen20 I 0IPL94-171IPL-total.shtml (last 
updated May 24, 2011) (displaying of the 2010 United States Census data, as it applies to 
Maryland). 
92 ld. 
93 Housing Statistics, MD. ASS'N OF REALTORS, http://mdrealtor.org/HousingStatistics/ 
HousingStatistics (last visited Feb. 27,2012). 
94 Refinance Activity Falls, Purchase Applications Steady in Latest MBA Weekly Survey, 
MORTGAGE BANKERS ASSOCIATION (May 27, 2009), available at http:// 
www.mortgagebankers.org/NewsandMediaiPressCenter/69022.htm. 
95 Calculated as follows: (54,605/.30) - 54,605 = 127,411.667. 
96 ld. 
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there are more than adequate legal resources available to support the 
transition to the proposed system. Further, as the mortgage finance 
market is substantially depressed from its peak in 2006 and 2007 (as seen 
by the precipitous decline in licensed lenders and originators)97, 
transitioning in the immediate future is likely to be easier and less 
disruptive than it might otherwise be if the mortgage marketplace was 
operating near capacity. Further, the addition of an insured professional 
subject to malpractice litigation into the regulatory process provides a 
social benefit in the form of additional financial resources available to 
defray the cost to Maryland's taxpayers in the event of an unfavorable 
outcome in any particular transaction. And, as I am not proposing an 
increase in the number of licensed attorneys in Maryland, the present 
professional oversight staff at the Attorney Grievance Commission is 
adequate to the task envisioned. Finally, the proposed system's enacting 
legislation should ensure that any attorney acting as a borrower's counsel 
may not simultaneously act as a settlement agent, to prevent the 
appearance of conflict. As the system is intended to capture the virtues of 
the adversarial system and the duties of loyalty and confidentiality, 
permitting an unnecessary compromise at the outset is contrary to the 
system's fundamental aims. 
It is exceptionally likely that this proposal will be manfully resisted by 
the mortgage lending industry. The proposed system will subject a 
powerful industry (with an exceptionally active and effective lobby) to a 
level of immediate scrutiny it is unaccustomed to, and to which it will not 
willingly submit. To further heighten the likelihood of resistance by the 
industry, I also propose that lenders be responsible for a flat fee payment 
toward the borrower's counsel fees. Consumers would be permitted to 
spend more than the flat fee, if desired and at their own expense, but 
lenders will be required to contribute a statutorily described fee for any 
application that progresses beyond initial data collection to the formal 
offer of financing stage (the issuance of a loan commitment and loan 
disclosure package). This requirement will fundamentally alter the 
current industry practice of providing estimates or offers to loan prospects 
prior to actually underwriting the transaction. These provisions are in no 
way punitive; instead, all they do is continue to place the regulatory costs 
of operating a regulated industry upon members of the industry who are 
involved in transactions governed by its rules. The provisions are 
intended to encourage lenders to more carefully evaluate the risks of 
extending credit by closely evaluating both loan applicants and the 
collateral securing the transaction. Finally, it is at this point that a lender 
97 Dep't of Legis. Servs., Fiscal Note, H.B. 292, 2009 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Md. 2009), 
available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2009rs/bilifilelhb0292.htm. 
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would be required to provide borrowers, along with the other disclosures 
required by statute, an admonition to contact a professional to review the 
offer. In order to ensure the independence of the consumer's advocate, I 
envision a state registry of certified counselors maintained by the 
Commissioner of Financial Regulation.98 Any authorized advocate could 
be employed by a consumer, and the lender will be prohibited from 
referring any particular counselor. 
As described above, this proposal will likely improve the overall 
performance of the mortgage marketplace by forcing lenders to compete 
on transparency, efficiency, and, ultimately, price. While these 
performance improvements will surely inure to the benefit of consumers, 
the mortgage lending industry also will realize substantial benefits; not 
the least of these is a marked decrease in the risk of default in any 
particular transaction (due to the factors discussed above) and the 
concomitant increase in the confidence of investors in the secondary 
market. 99 
CONCLUSION 
The proposal to co-opt the energy of the United States' tradition of 
adversarial advocacy, and the duties owed to clients by counsel to protect 
the interests of consumers, should not be viewed as a radical departure. 
We trust these systems with matters oflife and death. The very character 
of the United States' legal system is imbued with its ethic and its 
Constitutional overtones. 100 
However, what is clearly evident is that the current regulatory system 
proved inadequate to its task, and much of the blame for the real-estate 
market meltdown can be attributed to a backward-looking system of 
regulation by disclosure. The regime should be supplemented by active 
adversarial interactions that would serve as a prophylactic against 
systemic disaster, and protect individual consumers from error before 
they get into financial trouble. Disclosure is an extremely weak 
mechanism for protecting either the entire market or individual 
consumers, as was demonstrated by the recent meltdown. The bar is 
adequate to the task of providing the necessary help to consumers to 
98 As discussed in note 61 supra, the General Assembly may well decide to allow other 
professions that can demonstrate the requisite credentials to act as borrower's representatives. 
Should the Legislature decide to do so, some licensing would be necessary and could 
reasonably be administered by the Commissioner of Financial Regulation. The cost of any 
such system could be defrayed by licensing fees. However, it would serve one of this 
proposal's underlying considerations to require that any borrower representative must be able 
to maintain professional liability insurance. 
99 REpORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 11, at 55. 
100 Freedman, supra note 81, at 467-68. 
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alleviate the problem, the means are available to finance the 
administration of a regime funding legal services in the area, and savings 
accrued by avoiding default would likely outstrip any cost increases the 
new regime would cause. A mandatory right to counsel in the purchase 
of a home - likely the most important financial transaction the average 
citizen is likely to make over a lifetime - would be effective and is 
needed. All that is required now is the collective will to extend this right 
to home buyers and fund it. It is time for the Legislature to take up the 
task. 
